




Director of
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*Wednesday
11 May 1983*

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11 May 1983

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Contents

Western Europe-USSR: CSCE Developments 1

Chad: Impending Government Attack 2

Syria: Reaction to Lebanese-Israeli Agreement 3

Israel: Debate Over Beirut Accord 3



25X1

Suriname  **Keeping Lines Open** 4

25X1



USSR-Afghanistan: Increasing Aircraft Losses 6



25X1

France-China: Mitterrand's Visit 7

Special Analysis

Poland: Implications of Protests 8

25X1

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25X1

11 May 1983

Top Secret

25X1

WESTERN EUROPE-USSR: CSCE Developments

Soviet acceptance last Friday of the final document drafted by the neutral and nonaligned nations will test Allied unity in CSCE negotiations in the next few weeks. []

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The Soviets in effect rejected modifications the West had proposed last week. NATO representatives have agreed nonetheless to push for the revisions, which they believe are modest. They plan to respond cautiously and to seek a Western consensus on negotiating tactics. []

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West German Foreign Minister Genscher, who has been urging the US to accept the neutral and nonaligned draft with minimum changes, issued a statement praising Moscow's endorsement of the draft as a positive step. He added, however, that the East should address the substance of the proposed Western revisions. []

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Comment: The Allies for some time have been divided on the extent of the changes to the draft necessary to make it acceptable to both sides. The Italians, the French, and especially the West Germans have suggested that the West could show more flexibility, but the British and Dutch are reluctant to soften the Western position on human rights. []

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Most Allies agree that the talks in Madrid have to come to a successful end soon if the USSR is to be kept from gaining a public relations advantage in Western Europe. They also believe convening a European Disarmament Conference in the fall would counter somewhat the expected negative public reaction to initial INF deployments. []

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Even the Allies most strongly in favor of a more flexible approach, however, do not want to be seen as capitulating to the Soviets or as undermining Allied cohesion. These concerns could help to promote greater Western unity. []

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
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11 May 1983

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11 May 1983

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CHAD: Impending Government Attack

Government forces are planning a major attack against a Libyan-backed dissident base in the north some time this week. [redacted]

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President Habre has assembled his most experienced fighters to attack Ounianga Kebir, and senior officials who were with his old factional army are flying north to lead the troops. The attack was postponed from last Saturday to allow more arms to be delivered.

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French Cooperation Minister Nucci agreed to a slight increase in budgetary and development aid to Chad during his visit to N'Djamena last week but continued to be vague about expanding military assistance. According to the US Embassy in Paris, the French have allotted approximately \$8.5 million for nonmilitary aid to Chad this year. [redacted]

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Comment: The attack on Ounianga Kebir will be an important test for Habre. Failure would seriously damage his image as the anniversary of his first year in power approaches, and it could lead to some tendency on the part of his northern supporters to abandon him. The apparently improved situation in the Lake Chad region, however, will allow Habre to continue concentrating on the north. [redacted]

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11 May 1983

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SYRIA: Reaction to Lebanese-Israeli Agreement

Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam reiterated publicly on Monday that the Lebanese-Israeli draft withdrawal agreement is unacceptable to Damascus. He claimed the agreement compromises Lebanese sovereignty by allowing a residual Israeli military presence in the form of overflights and joint patrols, and by opening Lebanese borders to Israeli goods. Khaddam told US officials in Damascus yesterday that talks with Beirut on the draft agreement had not yet taken place and that the Lebanese had not requested a meeting. [REDACTED]

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Comment: President Assad probably hopes maintaining pressure on the Lebanese will force Beirut to reconsider ratifying the agreement. He has a reputation for hard bargaining and is likely to take an uncompromising position once talks on Syrian withdrawal begin. Assad would prefer continuation of the status quo, with its inherent risks of conflict, to an agreement that gives Israel political gains and reduces Syria's leverage on regional issues. [REDACTED]

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ISRAEL: Debate Over Beirut Accord

The Knesset reportedly will open debate on the draft agreement with Lebanon today. Defense Minister Arens told members of his Likud bloc on Monday that Syria is not likely to evacuate Lebanon, making the draft accord with Beirut impossible to implement. He also expressed misgivings over the idea of pulling the Israeli forces back to the al-Awwali River line in southern Lebanon. [REDACTED]

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Comment: Whether the Begin government will try to get formal approval of the agreement is not yet clear. Despite complaints by the Labor Party, the governing coalition probably would not lose a vote on this issue. Meanwhile, the Israelis do not appear to have altered their military posture following the evacuation of Soviet personnel from Beirut. [REDACTED]

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SURINAME

Keeping Lines Open

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Suriname apparently is trying to reduce its isolation by playing down its ties with Cuba. Prime Minister Alibux told the US Ambassador on Saturday that, if the US supported the government's recently announced program, Paramaribo's political course might evolve in a direction more to Washington's liking.

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Comment: Surinamese leaders hope such reassurances will result in additional aid. Alibux, who is a leftist, is likely to believe that support from other countries will strengthen his position at the expense of his pro-Cuban rivals.

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
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
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USSR-AFGHANISTAN: Increasing Aircraft Losses



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Comment: Since December 1979, the insurgents have shot down or destroyed in airfield attacks an estimated 300 Soviet and Afghan aircraft, mostly helicopters. At least another 110 have been lost in accidents. Soviet aircraft losses have risen as the insurgents have obtained additional heavy machineguns and probably more heat-seeking missiles and gained experience in their use. This has caused the Soviets to adopt restrictive tactics that have reduced the effectiveness of their air attacks.

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25X1

FRANCE-CHINA: Mitterrand's Visit

President Mitterrand's trip to China last week opened up new commercial opportunities but produced only a slight improvement in political relations. The French agreed, in a memorandum of understanding, to sell four nuclear reactors to the Chinese and accepted Beijing's guarantees of peaceful use. During the political discussions, the Chinese played down their objections to efforts by the French to arrange an agreement on Kampuchea, and both sides agreed that the Vietnamese should pull out. At the same time, however, France's continuing refusal to support a coalition that includes Pol Pot's Democratic Kampuchea prevented agreement on what kind of government should follow a Vietnamese withdrawal.

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Comment: Many details of the reactor deal, including financing, remain to be settled. A similar memorandum was signed several years ago and then allowed to lapse. China still opposes France's offer to provide limited economic aid to Vietnam. Mitterrand, however, may have allayed Chinese concerns arising from Foreign Minister Cheysson's recent implication that France preferred a continuation of Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea to a return of Pol Pot.

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Special Analysis

POLAND: Implications of Protests

The public protests in Poland last week, which were the largest since August, dramatized the continuing political deadlock involving opposition forces, the Church, and the regime. Public attention has now focused on the papal visit from 16 to 23 June, which will be a euphoric event for most Poles. Barring any unexpected incidents during the Pope's stay, the visit is unlikely to help break the stalemate.

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The demonstrations were not organized, but they may improve the morale of underground activists who lost confidence after their failures in 1982. Solidarity, however, was not able to make any progress toward regaining an official status.

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Underground leaders will avoid risky protests any time soon because they realize their weakness and the regime's commitment to maintaining control. They also realize that most workers are not any more willing than earlier to jeopardize their jobs by staging strikes.

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Before the Pope arrives, the regime may round up more underground activists and shut down their facilities. The authorities also will continue to reject publicly Lech Walesa's appeals for negotiations. Their increased harassment of Walesa, however, is only likely to spur him on.

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Attempts To Restore Normalcy

The government's repressive moves will complicate Premier Jaruzelski's efforts to create the outward trappings of normal political and economic life. Thus far, these efforts have had little success.

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The first congress of the Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth, an umbrella group intended to rally political support, was held last weekend. At this stage, however, it is little more than a paper organization, staffed with regime loyalists.

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The trade unions sponsored by the government now have more than 2 million members, out of an industrial labor force of 14 million. Few of them, however, show signs of defending workers' interests.

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The crackdown on intellectuals who supported Solidarity is continuing. The regime is disbanding their professional organizations and dismissing prominent artists.

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Jaruzelski evidently also has to cope with serious disputes in the Communist party, which may result in a further delay in holding the Central Committee party plenum. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Moscow's recent criticism of a Polish Communist party weekly for publishing "revisionist," "antisocialist," and "anti-Soviet" articles may be designed to lend support to Polish hardliners at the plenum. [REDACTED]

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The Papal Visit

All sides expect to gain from the Pope's visit. The regime probably hopes the trip will lead to an easing of Western sanctions and the reestablishment of more normal economic ties with West European countries. [REDACTED]

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The Church is urging the regime to free political prisoners and end martial law, but Church leaders may believe that they have to restate these demands to avoid appearing too cooperative with the authorities. [REDACTED]

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Walesa and others in the opposition hope the visit will encourage more resistance. They are unlikely, however, to take actions that could mar the Pope's stay in Poland. [REDACTED]

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The USSR's recent criticism clearly reflects concern over the demonstrations and the possibility of more trouble during and following the papal visit. A large Warsaw Pact exercise that is scheduled to begin in Poland later this month could provide the occasion for more Soviet commentary on conditions there. [REDACTED]

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Unless serious incidents occur, the papal visit probably will not have any immediate effect on the domestic political situation. In the short run, any form of increased social resistance will provoke swift reprisals. Over the longer term, the visit will help keep alive a sense of assertiveness that will continue to make it difficult for the regime to rule effectively on its terms. [REDACTED]

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